The End Of Knowledge - Vault 6/38 - CVPR - 2018 - Maximizing the Social Good: Markets without Money

graph LR classDef core fill:#f9d4d4, font-weight:bold, font-size:14px classDef monetary fill:#d4f9d4, font-weight:bold, font-size:14px classDef nonmonetary fill:#d4d4f9, font-weight:bold, font-size:14px classDef voting fill:#f9f9d4, font-weight:bold, font-size:14px classDef allocation fill:#f9d4f9, font-weight:bold, font-size:14px Main[Maximizing the Social
Good: Markets without
Money] Main --> A[Market design: algorithms
for resource allocation 1] A --> B[Societal value maximization
over revenue generation 2] A --> C[Money as measurement
and incentive tool 3] Main --> D[Monetary Mechanisms] D --> E[Ascending auctions allocate
to highest bidders 4] D --> F[Quadratic voting: buy
votes, pay quadratically 13] Main --> G[Non-monetary Mechanisms] G --> H[Markets without money:
alternatives to monetary incentives 5] H --> I[Congestion as incentive
for efficient routing 6] H --> J[Virtual rewards: badges,
leaderboards for contributions 7] J --> K[Badge systems reward
threshold contributions 8] J --> L[Leaderboards rank users
to incentivize participation 9] J --> M[Optimizing virtual reward
systems for contributions 10] M --> N[All-pay auctions parallel
virtual reward systems 11] Main --> O[Voting Mechanisms] O --> P[Voting systems elect
value-maximizing leaders 12] O --> Q[Point-based voting reveals
preference strengths 14] Main --> R[Allocation Mechanisms] R --> S[School choice mechanisms
assign students to schools 15] S --> T[Pareto efficiency: no
improvement without harm 16] S --> U[Deferred acceptance algorithm:
iterative matching 17] S --> V[Boston mechanism: irrevocable
acceptance by preference 18] V --> W[Single ticket raffle:
simplified Boston mechanism 19] R --> X[Risk measures preference
strength in allocation 20] Main --> Y[Design Considerations] Y --> Z[Approximately optimal non-monetary
mechanisms exist 21] Y --> AA[Fairness in allocation
design 22] Y --> AB[Simplicity in mechanism
design 23] Y --> AC[Ordinal vs cardinal
preferences in mechanisms 24] Y --> AD[Random tie-breaking in
priority-based systems 25] Y --> AE[Expressing preference strength
in mechanisms 26] Y --> AF[Intra-personal utility comparisons 27] Main --> AG[Future Directions] AG --> AH[Mechanism design without
money 28] AG --> AI[Alternatives: scarcity, risk,
fame, time 29] AG --> AJ[Applications: housing, dating,
social networks, data 30] class A,B,C core class D,E,F monetary class G,H,I,J,K,L,M,N nonmonetary class O,P,Q voting class R,S,T,U,V,W,X allocation class Y,Z,AA,AB,AC,AD,AE,AF,AG,AH,AI,AJ allocation

Resume:

1.- Market design: Studying markets as algorithms that interact with individuals to produce or allocate scarce resources.

2.- Societal value maximization: Focusing on markets that aim to maximize societal value rather than generate revenue.

3.- Money as a tool: Using money in market design to measure value and incentivize truthful reporting, even for non-profit goals.

4.- Ascending auctions: A method to allocate items to highest-value buyers by increasing prices until only one bidder remains.

5.- Markets without money: Exploring alternatives to monetary incentives in markets where using money is infeasible or unethical.

6.- Congestion as incentive: Using traffic congestion instead of tolls to route vehicles efficiently in road networks.

7.- Virtual rewards: Online platforms using badges, leaderboards, and other non-monetary incentives to encourage user contributions.

8.- Badge systems: Rewarding users with virtual badges when their contributions reach certain thresholds.

9.- Leaderboards: Ranking users based on their contributions to incentivize competition and increased participation.

10.- Optimizing virtual reward systems: Designing badge and leaderboard systems to maximize user contributions.

11.- All-pay auctions: Drawing parallels between virtual reward systems and all-pay auctions to optimize contribution incentives.

12.- Voting systems: Using votes instead of money to elect leaders that maximize societal value.

13.- Quadratic voting: A voting system where voters buy votes with money, paying quadratically more for additional votes.

14.- Point-based voting: Allocating points to voters to spend on candidates, creating trade-offs and revealing preference strengths.

15.- School choice mechanisms: Designing algorithms to assign students to schools based on preferences and priorities.

16.- Pareto efficiency: Seeking allocations where no student can be made better off without making another worse off.

17.- Deferred acceptance algorithm: An iterative method for matching students to schools based on preferences and priorities.

18.- Boston mechanism: A school choice algorithm where students are irrevocably accepted to schools in preference order.

19.- Single ticket raffle: A simplified version of the Boston mechanism using tickets to reveal strength of preferences.

20.- Risk as a metric: Using willingness to take risks as a way to measure preference strength in allocation mechanisms.

21.- Approximately optimal mechanisms: Showing that certain non-monetary mechanisms can achieve near-optimal outcomes in various settings.

22.- Fairness in allocation: Considering how to design mechanisms that are perceived as fair by participants.

23.- Simplicity in mechanism design: Striving for algorithms that are easy for participants to understand and use.

24.- Ordinal vs. cardinal preferences: Distinguishing between mechanisms that only use ranking information and those using preference strengths.

25.- Random tie-breaking: Using randomization to resolve ties in priority-based allocation systems.

26.- Expressing preference strength: Designing mechanisms that allow participants to indicate how strongly they prefer certain outcomes.

27.- Intra-personal utility comparisons: Focusing on comparing preferences within individuals rather than across individuals.

28.- Mechanism design without money: Applying mechanism design principles to settings where monetary transfers are not allowed.

29.- Alternatives to money: Using scarcity, risk, fame, and time as substitutes for money in mechanism design.

30.- Applications of non-monetary mechanisms: Exploring uses in public housing, online dating, social networks, and personal data markets.

Knowledge Vault built byDavid Vivancos 2024